News from ICLMG

ICLMG’s Submissions to the Foreign Interference Consultation

On February 9, 2024, ICLMG sent our submissions for the consultation on potential legislative changes to address foreign interference in Canada.

The first submission was sent to Public Safety Canada for their consultation, “Enhancing measures to counter foreign interference: Whether to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.”

The second submission was sent to Justice Canada’s consultation, “Addressing Foreign Interference: Whether to Amend the Security of Information Act and Modernize certain Criminal Code offences, and to Introduce a review mechanism in the Canada Evidence Act to manage sensitive information.”

While our focus area is on counterterrorism and not specifically countering foreign interference, there are also many similarities, particularly in the kinds of legislative changes being considered and the national security-related tools being proposed. Moreover, most of what is being proposed would not be limited to countering foreign interference but have wide-ranging impacts on CSIS’ capabilities across its mandate, and across various acts and aspects of the justice system.

SUMMARIES OF OUR SUBMISSIONS

General concerns

  • The framing of “foreign interference” itself, the lack of information around the breadth and impact of it, and the overall solutions proposed are focused on greater securitization, greater police and intelligence agency powers.
  • The politicization and vagueness of terms like “foreign interference” and how they can be usurped to achieve and support goals unrelated to ensuring security of individuals in Canada.
  • Much like with counter terrorism, attempts to counter foreign interference – as demonstrated in recent public discourse – can lead to racial, religious and political profiling.
  • Most of the proposals for legislative changes in this consultation are not supported by evidence that they are necessary, and would have impact far beyond addressing foreign interference.

Submission to Public Safety Canada on “Enhancing measures to counter foreign interference: Whether to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act”

1. The government should explore avenues to improve information sharing that do not include legislative changes to the CSIS Act

– CSIS already shares threat assessment related information with the private sector, and national security agencies have held regular classified briefings with national resource companies.

– There are ongoing concerns regarding systemic bias and racism: anonymous leaks of unsubstantiated information alleging foreign interference by specific individuals or entire communities, some of which have been disproven or are unsupported by public evidence.

– There are important issues of accuracy, transparency, privacy and recourse regarding intelligence sharing that are not addressed in the consultation and may outweigh any benefits of increased information sharing.

2. We oppose new production order powers and new collection powers

– CSIS data collection and retention powers have been greatly expanded in the past five years and not enough justification has been given in this consultation document to support further expansion.

– The vague language used to describe the basis and thresholds for issuing a production order – “reasonably believes,” “likely” to yield or assist, and information “of importance” – could lead to unnecessary and broad requests for information without appropriate justification.

– CSIS has a troubling history of disdain for the existing warrant process, and courts have found CSIS guilty multiple times of misleading them or leaving out key information.

3. We oppose granting CSIS the power to collect foreign intelligence held outside Canada regarding a foreign state or a foreign individual located within Canada

– The intent of the limitation of “within Canada” was to avoid: “aggressive ‘covert’ and ‘offensive’ activities abroad,” so as “to mitigate the political diplomatic and moral risk of conducting foreign intelligence collection, which [has] the potential to breach foreign international law [and] foreign domestic law and bring disrepute to Canada’s international reputation […].” The proposal does not address how this would be safeguarded against with any new CSIS collection powers. We would also be concerned that this would provide CSIS with vast new powers to collect information abroad without appropriate oversight or justification.

4. It is inappropriate, inadequate and worrisome to address the question of CSIS’ dataset regime in this consultation, and we oppose expanding the regime and allowing the sharing of datasets with domestic partners or foreign entities

– Not only do we continue to question the creation of this regime itself, and believe the current legislation around datasets is too broad and permissive – as it expanded CSIS collection powers to information that is not strictly necessary for its mandate – it already allows for non-authorized datasets to be queried under exigent circumstances.

– Ample powers already exist for CSIS to cooperate with the RCMP, CSE and CBSA, and information disclosure powers exist under the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act.

– Once a dataset is shared with another entity, it becomes incredibly difficult to control how it is used; and that is exponentially amplified when sharing with a foreign jurisdiction.


Submission to Justice Canada on “Whether to Amend the Security of Information Act and Modernize certain Criminal Code offences, and to Introduce a review mechanism in the Canada Evidence Act to manage sensitive information”

1. We generally oppose the creation of the proposed new foreign interference offences

– The concerning tenor of the discussion on foreign interference in Canada to date could lead, as it does around counter-terrorism, to overreach and over-securitization in addressing this issue. Such a response would undermine fundamental rights and, with it, democratic involvement and participation. This in turn can lead to more tension and divisions, and the further marginalization of racialized, Indigenous or immigrant populations, as well as those involved in dissent, protest and challenging the status quo.

– It is also important to ensure that responses beyond policing, intelligence, criminal charges and penalty increases at sentencing are appropriately explored, such as non-punitive approaches that respond to the societal roots of harms.

– Given our concerns around the overly-broad and discretionary labeling of organizations as “terrorist entities”, we are worried that the current definition of foreign entity could be misapplied. The definition should therefore not be expanded.

3. We believe any changes to Canada’s sabotage offence should be limited

– We oppose the broad expansion of what is considered critical infrastructure, and are concerned with the inclusion of the protection of “economic well-being” in the examples offered. This could include private interests that, for example, are at odds with environmental or social concerns.

– We oppose the creation of an offence against the possession of a device to commit sabotage. The vast majority of devices covered would likely end up being dual or multi-use. The Criminal Code already contains offences related to the intent to commit an offence, that is sufficient.

4. We continue to oppose secret processes in administrative, immigration and criminal proceedings, as well as new efforts to normalize and expand their use

– The growing use of these secret processes is eroding, and will continue to erode, human rights, democracy, fairness and public confidence in not just the government, but in the judiciary itself.

5. We are opposed to reforms that would further entrench national security secrecy in courts and limit the need for the government to disclose evidence

– Instead of allowing judges to appoint a kind of “special advocate,” justice would be better served by allowing counsel for the defence to engage in an undertaking to not disclose information, and therefore be able to fully argue on behalf of their client.

– We oppose the elimination of a defendant’s ability to file interlocutory appeals relating to disclosure, as the rights of the accused would be irreparably harmed by limiting appeals to after a decision is rendered.

– Finally, we oppose the expansion of the grounds to grant a sealing order to include, “international relations, national defence or national security,” as all three terms are very broad in scope and could seriously erode transparency and openness in the judicial system.

Since you’re here…

… we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.panel-54141172-image-6fa93d06d6081076-320-320You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!
make-a-donation-button

ICLMG’s submission to the Privacy Commissioner’s consultation on biometrics guidance

On October 11, 2023, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched a public consultation on new draft guidance on biometric technologies.

The draft guidance provides information on privacy obligations, considerations, and best practices for handling biometric information. It is divided into two documents: Draft Guidance for processing biometrics – for organizations and Draft Guidance for processing biometrics – for public institutions.

ICLMG analyzed and commented on the draft guidance for public institutions both during a virtual call with OPC staff, and online. Here are our answers to the consultation questions relevant to our mandate:

1. Identifying appropriate purposes:

Are there specific uses of biometrics that should be considered inappropriate? Should we define these no-go zones in the guidance?

Yes, we believe that there should be specific no-go zones established in the guidance for both private and public institutions. This includes:

  • The use of biometrics for real-time surveillance in public spaces (for example, at protests, in airports, at the border, at shopping malls, at sports arenas, etc.)
  • Biometrics should never be used for indiscriminate, mass surveillance
  • Biometrics should never be used to attempt to evaluate emotions or feelings
  • Biometrics should never be used to attempt to ascertain gender or sexual orientation
  • Biometrics should never be used to attempt to ascertain or predict the activities of groups of protected classes of people (ie, predictive policing of specific communities)

Greater consideration should also specifically be given to the collection and use of biometrics in immigration and asylum cases, given the sensitivity in these cases. While we do not have specific suggestions for no-go zones at this time, renewed focus on what is appropriate or inappropriate in this sector is necessary.

[…]

4. Accountability:

Are there requirements in the guidance that should be specifically directed towards vendors/manufacturers of biometric equipment, and the organizations that choose to use such equipment for the collection of biometric data?

For both private and public institutions, we would suggest guidance that they be proactive and public about their use of technology, and which technology, they use to collect biometric data; how they select which technology to use; what safeguards are in place; and how to request information about the use of their biometric information and what recourse individuals have. This would go beyond their being prepared to respond to questions upon request and rather ensure information is as accessible as possible.

We are also strongly supportive of the guidance under the “Accountability” section for public institutions explaining that they “must do [their] due diligence to ensure accountability of third party service providers and that they are acting lawfully.”

5. General:

Are there any other outstanding areas of regulatory uncertainty that this guidance can help clarify? If so, what are they and why do you think they should be included?

We are concerned that current privacy and national security laws grant intelligence agencies, and to a lesser degree law enforcement agencies, exceptions to the obligations that other public institutions must follow. This would allow, for example, intelligence agencies to collect and use biometric information in ways that would not be allowed for other institutions; allow them to not disclose their use of biometric data; and deny individuals the ability to know how their information is being used or to request its destruction. We would suggest that a specific mention be made in the guidance that all government agencies, including national security and law enforcement bodies, are expected to adhere to this guidance.

Further, we would suggest a caveat that while this guidance is in relation to the Privacy Act, that it should also be taken into consideration when government departments disclose or collect information under other acts, with the specific example of the Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act (SCIDA). For example, considerations around limiting collection, limiting use, disclosure and retention, safeguards and accuracy should also be considered when considering the disclosure of biometric data under SCIDA.

*****

ICLMG maintains its long-standing opposition to the use of facial recognition technology, especially by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Please take action below to protect our rights from facial recognition:

TAKE ACTION

We also encourage you to read the submission made by La Ligue des droits et libertés, one of our members (in French only).

Since you’re here…

… we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.panel-54141172-image-6fa93d06d6081076-320-320You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!
make-a-donation-button

Amend or reject: 100+ groups call for crucial changes to UN Cybercrime Treaty

The ICLMG has joined more than 100 other organizations globally setting out red-lines on the protection of civil liberties in the proposed UN Cybercrime Treaty. We are urging the Canadian government and all other member states to either incorporate crucial changes to the agreement, or to vote against it all together.

Joint Statement on the Proposed Cybercrime Treaty Ahead of the Concluding Session

23 January, 2024

We, the undersigned organizations and individual experts call on the state delegations participating in the concluding session of the United Nations (UN) Ad Hoc Committee to ensure that the proposed Cybercrime Convention (the Convention) is narrowly focused on tackling cybercrime, and not used as a tool to undermine human rights. Absent meaningful changes to address these shortcomings, the Convention should be rejected.

Civil society groups have contributed time and expertise to improve the draft and fully align it with existing human rights law and standards, the principles of the UN Charter and the rule of law, as well as best practices to provide legal certainty in efforts to improve cybersecurity. Our concerns about the proposed text of the Convention are informed by our experience and human rights advocacy around the world. National and regional cybercrime laws are regrettably far too often misused to unjustly target journalists and security researchers, suppress dissent and whistleblowers, endanger human rights defenders, limit free expression, and justify unnecessary and disproportionate state surveillance measures.

Throughout the negotiations over the last two years, civil society groups and other stakeholders have consistently emphasized that the fight against cybercrime must not come at the expense of human rights, gender equality, and the dignity of the people whose lives will be affected by this Convention. It should not result in impeding security research and making us all less secure. Robust and meaningful safeguards and limitations are essential to avoid the possibility of abuse of relevant provisions of the Convention that could arise under the guise of combating cybercrime. Regrettably, the latest draft of the proposed Convention, which is due to be finalized by February 2024, fails to address many of our significant concerns. We believe that if the text of the Convention is approved in its current form, the risk of abuses and human rights violations will increase exponentially and leave us with a less secure internet.

We are particularly concerned that the latest draft of the Convention:

  • Remains over-broad in the scope of the range of the activities it requires states to criminalize. It includes cyber-enabled offenses and other content-related crimes and creates legal uncertainty through an open-ended reference to crimes under other “applicable international conventions and protocols.” This overbroad scope gives rise to the danger that the Convention will be used to criminalize legitimate online expression, which is likely to create discriminatory impacts and deepen gender inequality;
  • Fails to incorporate language sufficient to protect security researchers, whistleblowers, activists, and journalists from excessive criminalization;
  • Contains insufficient references to states’ obligations under international human rights law, includes weak domestic human rights safeguards in its criminal procedural chapter, and fails to explicitly incorporate robust safeguards applicable to the whole treaty to ensure that cybercrime efforts provide adequate protection for human rights and are in accordance with the principles of legality, non-discrimination, legitimate purpose, necessity, and proportionality;
  • Lacks effective gender mainstreaming which is critical to ensure the Convention is not used to undermine people’s human rights on the basis of gender;
  • Proposes to create legal regimes to monitor, store, and allow cross-border sharing of information in a manner that would undermine trust in secure communications and infringe on international human rights standards, including the requirements for prior judicial authorization and the principles of legality, non discrimination, legitimate purpose, necessity, and proportionality;
  • Permits excessive information sharing for law enforcement cooperation, beyond the scope of specific criminal investigations and without specific, explicit data protection and human rights safeguards.

The Convention should only move forward if it pursues a specific goal of combating cybercrime without endangering the human rights and fundamental freedoms of those it seeks to protect nor undermining efforts to improve cybersecurity for an open internet. The present draft text falls far short of this goal and these basic minimum requirements, and must be comprehensively revised, amended, or rejected.

Therefore, we call on all state delegations to:

  • Narrow the scope of the whole Convention to cyber-dependent crimes specifically defined and included in its text;
  • Make certain the Convention includes provisions to ensure that security researchers, whistleblowers, journalists, and human rights defenders are not prosecuted for their legitimate activities and that other public interest activities are protected;
  • Guarantee that explicit data protection and human rights standards – including the principles of non-discrimination, legality, legitimate purpose, necessity and proportionality – are applicable to the whole Convention. Specific, explicit safeguards, such as the principle of prior judicial authorization, must be put in place for accessing or sharing data, as well as for conducting cross-border investigations and cooperation in accordance with the rule of law;
  • Mainstream gender across the Convention as a whole and throughout each article in efforts to prevent and combat cybercrime;
  • Limit the scope of application of procedural measures and international cooperation to the cyber-dependent crimes established in the criminalization chapter of the Convention;
  •  Avoid endorsing any surveillance provision that can be abused to undermine cybersecurity and encryption.

As the UN Ad Hoc Committee convenes its concluding session, we call on state delegations to redouble their efforts to address these critical gaps in the current draft. The final outcome of the treaty negotiation process should only be deemed acceptable if it effectively incorporates strong and meaningful safeguards to protect human rights, ensures legal clarity for fairness and due process, and fosters international cooperation under the rule of law. The proposed Convention must not serve as a validation of intrusion and surveillance practices harmful to human rights.

Absent these minimum requirements, we call on state delegations to reject the draft treaty and not advance it to the UN General Assembly for adoption.

Signatories

NGOs participating under operative paragraphs 8 or 9

  • Access Now
  • Association for Progressive Communications (APC)
  • ARTICLE 19
  • Center for Democracy and Technology
  • CyberPeace Institute
  • Data Privacy Brasil
  • Derechos Digitales
  • Electronic Frontier Foundation
  • Freedom House
  • Global Partners Digital
  • Hiperderecho
  • Human Rights Watch
  • Instituto Panamericano de Derecho y Tecnologia (IPANDETEC)
  • International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)
  • Jokkolabs Banjul
  • Jonction – Senegal
  • Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet)
  • Privacy International
  • R3D: Red en Defensa de los Derechos Digitales
  • Temple University, Institute for Law, Innovation & Technology (iLIT)

Additional signatories supporting the statement

  • 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media
  • ActiveWatch
  • Advocacy for Principled Action in Government
  • Afghanistan Journalists Center (AFJC)
  • Africa Freedom of Information Centre (AFIC)
  • AfroLeadership
  • Albanian Media Institute
  • Alliance of Independent Journalists Indonesia (AJI)
  • Alternatif Bilisim (AiA-Alternative Informatics Association)
  • Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN)
  • Bahrain Center for Human Rights
  • Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio & Communication (BNNRC)
  • BC Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA)
  • Bytes for All
  • Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)
  • Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM)
  • Cartoonists Rights Network International
  • Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility
  • Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP)
  • Centre for Free Expression (CFE)
  • Centre for Information Technology and Development (CITAD)
  • Centre for Independent Journalism (Malaysia)
  • Chaos Computer Club (CCC)
  • Committee to Protect Journalists
  • Douwe Korff, Emeritus Professor of International Law, London Metropolitan University
  • Digital Empowerment Foundation
  • DigitalReach
  • Digital Rights Foundation
  • Digital Rights Ireland
  • Digitale Gesellschaft
  • Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
  • Epicenter.works – for digital rights
  • European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL)
  • European Digital Rights (EDRi)
  • European Summer School in Internet Governance (EURO-SSIG)
  • Federation of Nepali Journalists
  • Foundation for Media Alternatives
  • Fundación Karisma
  • Fundación Internet Bolivia
  • Foundation for Information Policy Research
  • Freedom Forum, Nepal
  • Free Media Movement – Sri Lanka
  • Globe International Center
  • Government Information Watch
  • Gulf Center for Human Rights (GCHR)
  • Human Rights Network for Journalists-Uganda (HRNJ-U)
  • IFoX (Initiative for Freedom of Expression–Turkey)
  • Independent Journalism Center Moldova
  • International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG)
  • International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH)
  • International Press Institute (IPI)
  • International Press Centre (IPC) Lagos-Nigeria
  • Institute for Research on Internet and Society (IRIS)
  • Instituto de Pesquisa em Direito e Tecnologia do Recife – IP.rec
  • Instituto Nupef
  • IT-Pol Denmark
  • Japan Comuter Access Network (JCA-NET)
  • Korean Progressive Network Center – Jinbonet
  • Laboratory of Public Policy and Internet – LAPIN
  • LaLibre.net Tecnologías Comunitarias
  • Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH)
  • Maharat Foundation
  • Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)
  • Media Rights Agenda (MRA)
  • Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA)
  • Media Policy Institute
  • Media Watch
  • Metamorphosis Foundation
  • Mizzima
  • OpenMedia
  • Pakistan Press Foundation
  • Palestinian Center for Development & Media Freedoms (MADA)
  • Paradigm Initiative (PIN)
  • PEN International
  • Restore the Fourth
  • Social Media Exchange (SMEX)
  • SocialTIC
  • South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO)
  • South East European Network for Professionalization of Media (SEENPM)
  • Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)
  • Statewatch
  • Surveillance Resistance Lab
  • Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (STOP)
  • Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression
  • TEDIC
  • The Tor Project
  • Unwanted Witness
  • Valerie Steeves, Full Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa
  • Vigilance for Democracy and the Civic State
  • Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, Professor Emeritus, University of Aarhus, former ICANN Board Member
Page 5 of 103« First...34567...102030...Last »