On December 5th, 2024, ICLMG’s National Coordinator Tim McSorley, testified at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights for their study of Bill C-63, the Online Harms Act. You can watch his short testimony above, the full panel here or read his remarks here.

As part of this study, we also submitted a brief to the committee detailing our concerns as well as our recommendations to address them:

In 2021, the federal government published a proposal for online harms regulations. The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) joined many other organizations and experts in opposing significant parts of that proposal.[1] The government responded by engaging in further consultation, resulting in the introduction of Bill C-63, An Act to enact the Online Harms Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act and An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts, in March 2024.

Bill C-63 responds in many ways to the critiques that ICLMG and others leveled regarding the first proposal:

• While still including seven different categories of harms,[2] it proposes more severe rules around content moderation for the sharing of “content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor” as well as “intimate content communicated without consent,” as opposed to one approach for all seven harms.
• There is no explicit requirement that would require platforms to monitor all content in order to identify and remove harmful posts.
• The main focus is on the regulation of platforms, in the form of obligations to create and follow online safety plans, and not on policing all users.
• Except for content that sexually victimizes a child, there is no requirement for mandatory reporting of content or users to the RCMP or CSIS.
• There are no proposals to create new CSIS warrant powers.
• There are greater rules around platform accountability, transparency and reporting.

However, there remain serious areas of concern:

• Part 1 of the Act:
  • The harm of “content that incites violent extremism or terrorism” is overly broad and vague, and encompasses kinds of activities that are not defined in law, opening the likely possibility of excessive censorship. Further, given the inclusion of the online harm of “content that incites violence,” it is redundant and unnecessary.
  • The definition of “content that incites violence” is also overly broad, allowing for the possibility of content advocating for protest and civil disobedience to be made inaccessible on social media platforms.
  • While not explicitly requiring platforms to proactively monitor content, the Act does not disallow such actions either.
  • Lack of clarity in the definition of what is considered a regulated service could lead to platforms being required to monitor, and likely “break”, encryption tools that protect online privacy.
  • Platforms would be required to preserve certain data relating to posts alleged to incite violence or to incite violent extremism or terrorism for one year; this is likely to ensure that the data is available if law enforcement receive judicial authorization to request it. However, the current wording leaves the breadth of the requirement uncertain and in need of clarification/narrowing.
  • While the Act lays out transparency requirements for online platforms, it fails to include algorithmic transparency in regard to how content is recommended.
• Part 2 of the Act:
  • This section amends Canada’s existing hate crime offences and creates a new stand-alone hate crime offence, and is only tangentially related to Part 1. It has raised serious concerns among human rights and civil liberties advocates in regard to the breadth of the offences and the associated penalties. As it does not touch explicitly on counter-terrorism concerns, it falls outside of ICLMG’s mandate so we will be limiting our comments. However, this does not signal that there is not a significant need for amendments and for consideration of splitting Parts 2 and 3 from the bill to be considered separately. [The brief was sent before the government’s announcement that they would be splitting the bill as we advocated for.]

Read the full brief here for detailed proposals to address some of our specific concerns.

Footnotes

[1] International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, “Submission to the federal government’s consultation on its proposed approach to address harmful content online.” 25 September 2021. Online: https://iclmg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Online-Harms-Submission-ICLMG.pdf

[2] (a) intimate content communicated without consent; (b) content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor; (c) content that induces a child to harm themselves; (d) content used to bully a child; (e) content that foments hatred; (f) content that incites violence; and (g) content that incites violent extremism or terrorism.

Since you’re here… … we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!

As revealed on the November 20th episode of CBC’s Power & Politics, Dr. Hassan Diab – a Canadian citizen, husband, father and sociology professor – has recently been the target of a smear campaign, including calls for his dismissal from Carleton University, attacks on his reputation and, appallingly, death threats against him and his family.

It is in this context that the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (ICLMG) reiterates its support for Dr. Hassan Diab, an innocent man who was wrongfully convicted in an unfair trial.

We have also sent a letter to the President of Carleton University, Jerry Tomberlin, and its Board of Governors asking them to issue a statement in support of Dr. Diab’s innocence, take measures to protect him and his family from harassment, and ensure his continued employment at Carleton University.

The ICLMG is a Canadian coalition of 44 national civil society organizations that came together to protect civil liberties in the context of the ‘War on Terror.’ As such, we have been closely following the case of Dr. Diab since the beginning: since reviewing the facts of his case early on, we have advocated for due process and a fair trial, against his extradition, for the end to his years-long detention in France, for Canada to protect Dr. Diab against a potential second extraction, and for the reform of Canadian extradition laws overall.

A summary of the facts demonstrates clearly that Dr. Diab has been the victim of a miscarriage of justice:

• Before France sent its 2008 request for the extradition of Hassan Diab, it secretly sent Canada the fingerprints they found on a hotel registration form filled out by the bomber for comparison with Dr. Diab’s: they did not match. France requested his extradition anyway, and that comparison was not divulged to the court, as sharing such evidence is not mandatory under extradition law.
• Canadian judge Robert Maranger felt forced by the extradition law to extradite Dr. Diab, even though he stated that the evidence was “illogical, convoluted, very confusing, with conclusions that were suspect” that “France presented a weak case,” and “the prospects of conviction in a fair trial seem unlikely.”
• The French investigative judges charged with Dr. Diab’s case, Jean-Marc Herbaut and Richard Foltzer, verified that he was not in France at the time of the 1980 attack, and he was finally released and return to Canada in 2018. The judges testified in support of Dr Diab in the April 2023 trial, pleading the court not to convict an innocent man – alas in vain.
• In 2018, following Hassan Diab’s return to Canada, Prime Minister Trudeau stated, “I think, for Hassan Diab, we have to recognize first of all that what happened to him never should have happened.”
• In 2019, in an unprecedented move, a French court of appeal reversed the decision of the two investigating judges to release Dr. Diab. The ruling contains multiple errors of fact, leans on unreliable evidence, misstates its own mandated handwriting report, and resorts to sheer speculation in an effort to explain away exculpatory fingerprint and consistent alibi evidence.
• In 2021, the Cour de Cassation (France’s supreme court) upheld the 2019 appellate court decision despite France’s own Advocate General asking the court to reject it, acknowledging that the decision relied upon contradictory reasoning and failed to address important issues raised by Dr. Diab’s defence.
• In April 2023 the Assize Court in Paris, France, declared Dr. Diab guilty following a rushed and unfair trial held in absentia:
  • • No new evidence was presented.
    • Anonymous and unsourced secret intelligence were reintroduced.
    • Handwriting reports by prosecution ‘evidence’, originally rejected and withdrawn as totally unreliable, were allowed back (sometimes with ‘new’ conclusions).
    • Journalists who were not witnesses to the events were called to give their ‘opinions’.
    • There are no official transcripts or recordings of the proceedings.
    • A verdict was given in less than a day following the end of the trial.
    • No appeal is possible following an in absentia
    • The evidence that Dr. Diab was in Lebanon at the moment of the attack was inexplicably ignored.

The victims of the 1980 Rue Copernic bombing and their families deserve justice. But justice cannot be achieved by scapegoating an innocent man.

We invite you to share this statement publicly and with anyone misinformed about – or misrepresenting – the facts of Dr. Hassan Diab’s case: Facebook + Twitter + Instagram

Finally, please take action below for Canada to protect him from a potential second extradition request. Thank you!

TAKE ACTION

ICLMG’s National Coordinator, Tim McSorley, testified at the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development meeting on November 28, 2024 for their study of Bill C-353, the Foreign Hostage Takers Accountability Act.

Although we agree with the intent of the bill to support survivors of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention as well as their families, this bill is unnecessary, and would have very broad, negative, and unintended consequences.

1. We are overall skeptical of attempts to establish new sanctions regimes in general, as they have not been effective in protecting rights internationally.
2. We are concerned about low thresholds in this bill, such as levying sanctions on the basis of “opinion”.
3. The definition of “arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations” will exclude some of the gravest cases of state-sanctioned arbitrary detention.
4. The very broad application of sanctions within this legislation, including to anyone who makes available any property to a sanctioned state, entity or individual working on their behalf, would prohibit the provision of aid.
5. We agree completely that more must be done to support survivors of these horrendous acts and their families and loved ones. However, this support should not be tied to a sanctions regime.

You can watch the full committee meeting on ParlVu here.

TRANSCRIPT

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to the committee for this invitation to speak to Bill C-353.

I am here on behalf of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a coalition of 44 Canadian civil society organizations, which works to defend civil liberties in the context of national security and anti-terrorism measures.

Through our work, we are acutely aware of the severe impacts faced by individuals who are taken hostage or arbitrarily detained. It is clear more must be done to support the survivors of such acts, and their families and loved ones. We have been active in supporting Canadian citizens and permanent residents who have faced arbitrary detention abroad. This includes the well-known cases of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati, and Muayyed Nureddin, all detained and tortured in Syrian prisons, as well as Khaled Al Qazzaz, arbitrarily detained by the military government in Egypt, and Abousfian Abdelrazik, arbitrarily detained and tortured by Sudanese national security forces. More recently, we have advocated for the return of all Canadians arbitrarily detained in northeast Syria, including Canadian women and children in detention camps and Canadian men being held incommunicado and without charges in life-threatening conditions in prisons.

We cannot be clearer that hostage-taking and arbitrary detention violate Canadian and international law and that Canada must act to address these crimes.

While we agree with the intent of the bill to support survivors and their families, we do not believe that this bill is necessary, and that in fact it could have negative, unintended consequences both in countering arbitrary detention and more broadly.

First, we are overall skeptical of attempts to establish new sanctions regimes in general. There is a growing body of research that the increase in unilateral sanctions regimes has not been effective in protecting rights internationally, and that they can result in wasted resources, and have severe, unintended consequences on the delivery and provision of international aid.

If sanctions are believed to be necessary, they must be narrow and targeted. This is not the case with Bill C-353. It would target not just individuals, but broadly defined foreign entities, and entire foreign states, including, according to section 5(3)(a), the property of any national within a sanctioned state. This poses a real threat of unintended consequences that could impact humanitarian aid, international assistance, peacebuilding and even diplomacy. It also means that such sanctions could, if a government wanted to, be used to punish broad swathes of foreign nationals, their governments and their associations in arbitrary, political ways.

Second, we are concerned about low thresholds in this bill. For example, section 5(1) allows for the levying of sanctions on the basis that the Governor in Council is “of the opinion” that a foreign national, state or entity is responsible for or complicit in, hostage taking or state-to-state arbitrary detention. These are incredibly broad powers to be granted based solely an opinion.

Moreover, section 7, in allowing the Minister to require any person to provide them with any information that is relevant to an order or regulation under 5(1), would permit the Minister to go on a fishing expedition for information. There are no provisions for how that information is to be handled or disposed of.

Third, the definition of “arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations” will exclude some of the gravest cases of state-sanctioned arbitrary detention. The definition of arbitrary detention in this bill requires that, “when a person arbitrarily arrests or detains the individual to compel action from, or exercise leverage over, a foreign government.” In all the cases I listed at the beginning, the arbitrary detention was either done with Canada’s complicity or for objectives unrelated to Canada, and not to “compel action from a foreign government.” Beyond the cases I cited above, we can also look, among others, to that of Huseyin Celil, a Canadian citizen and a Uyghur human rights activist originally from China, who has been arbitrarily detained by that government since 2006. Given that China’s interest has nothing to do with influencing Canada or another state, but rather punishing human rights activism, this Act would not apply.

Fourth, the very broad application of sanctions within this legislation, including to anyone who makes available any property to a sanctioned state, entity or individual working on their behalf, would prohibit the provision of aid. And while section 6 allows for the Minister to provide a permit to carry out an activity that would violate an order under this act, the length of time it would take to secure a permit could have severe impacts on the timely delivery of aid and could lead to organizations simply not applying at all. Moreover, it could negatively impact instances where families or employers are negotiating with hostage-takers. They may need to act quickly, but would risk violating this order unless they receive a permit.

Finally, we agree completely that more must be done to support survivors of these horrendous acts and their families and loved ones. However, this support should not be tied to a sanctions regime. Nor are we convinced that the answer lies in new legislation. We would point instead to the recommendations of this committee’s 2018 report on the provision of consular services. There are clearly other levers that are already available to the government to act in this area, and would urge the government and committee to further pursue that path.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Since you’re here… … we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!