The serious flaws and violations of the law uncovered in the first ever rigorous and independent review of Canada’s secretive No Fly List regime require an immediate response and urgent action on the part of the Canadian government.
For 20 years, Canada has operated a troubling, secretive regime that prevents individuals, including Canadians, from flying out of or returning to Canada, undermining Charter rights and due process in the courts. The newly released report from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency – the independent federal watchdog tasked with examining Canada’s national security activities – offers an unprecedented look at the internal workings of Canada’s no fly list regime, formally known as the Passenger Protect Program (PPP). NSIRA’s troubling findings reaffirm the fact that secret lists based on overly broad national security concerns are a recipe for rights violations.
Among the report’s findings are that:
On at least six occasions since the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA), which governs the PPP, came into force in 2015, Public Safety Canada failed to review the list within 90 days, in contravention of the law
Two individuals continued to be listed despite recommendations of their removal, without evidence as to why
Three individuals have continued to be listed for reasons that are not in compliance with the Secure Air Travel Act, in contravention of the law
While, by law, the list is reviewed every 90 days, an unknown number of individual cases are not being updated because the individuals are no longer under investigation
Government departments that sign-off on the 90 day review are not actually reviewing the list
The government has failed to appropriately identify or mitigate risks of listed peoples’ mistreatment by foreign entities when the list is shared with foreign airlines, in violation of Canada’s Avoiding Complicity in Foreign Mistreatment Act
A lack of clear or consistent guidance around risk factors, including those used in deciding when to list or delist an individual, run the risk of unreasonable or unfair treatment
Decisions at time of boarding a plane did not match decisions taken when an individual was listed
Even when individuals were able to apply to the Minister for a review of their listing, indicators that an individual posed a risk under the SATA regime were not consistently applied, not clearly interpreted, and decisions made were not consistently documented
There is a lack of internal oversight or feedback mechanisms to address or reconcile these issues
There is an overall lack of coordination, leadership and rigour in administering the SATA
In many cases, even when a listed individual is not subject to a denial of boarding, the result is still that they miss their flight. This is due to, for example, the amount of time that Public Safety takes to decide on what direction to provide to the airline, or the amount of time taken to carry out additional questioning of the listed person.
It is incredibly alarming that, because of a combination of administrative errors, lack of investigation, or incoherent policies, an unknown number of individuals currently on Canada’s No Fly List are essentially in an administrative black hole. Worse still is that individuals who are not deemed a threat under the criteria of the SATA, or who have been recommended to be delisted, remain on the list.
On February 10, 2026, ICLMG’s National Coordinator testified at the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology (SOCI) for their study of the rights-violating and xenophobic Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act.
Watch his 5-minute intervention above or read the transcript of his remarks below.
Good morning and thank you for this opportunity to share concerns and feedback regarding Bill
C-12 on behalf of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a coalition of 44 Canadian
civil society organizations that works to defend civil liberties in the context of national security
and counter-terrorism measures.
Since the introduction of Bill C-12, and of Bill C-2 before that, we have expressed our urgent concern that this legislation poses a danger to the rights and livelihoods of migrants and refugees in Canada, as well as the privacy rights of nearly all people across the country.
As a coalition focused on national security and civil liberties, it may not be apparent why we would speak out over legislation relating to changes in the immigration and refugee system. In our work, though, we have seen time and again how migrants and refugees are used as scapegoats for challenges we face in society, and how quickly and easily they are unjustly framed as national security or public safety threats. We cannot forget the roots of this legislation: it is the follow-up to $1.3 billion announced in December 2024 to increase surveillance, law enforcement and other security measures at our border as a response to accusations from the United States that Canada poses a severe security threat to our southern neighbor, despite clear evidence that this simply is not true.
It is unacceptable that Canada would erode fundamental rights or dismantle systems meant to welcome newcomers and protect those fleeing injustice because of trumped up pressure and manufactured emergencies.
Given all of this, we believe Bill C-12 is fundamentally flawed, and must be withdrawn. Barring that, there are specific areas of the bill that we believe deserve attention.
I’m glad to be on this panel with so many esteemed colleagues who will be able to speak to various aspects of Bill C-12. For my part, I would like to focus on two crucial areas.
First, we are opposed the changes in part 7 of Bill C-12, that would grant Cabinet the extraordinary ability to issue orders to, among other things, suspend or terminate applications for various forms of visas or other immigration documents, as well as to cancel, vary or suspend existing immigration documents, including temporary visas and permanent residency cards, based on the vague notion of “Public Interest.”
Such broad powers, with no safeguards apart from public reporting, are ripe for abuse, particularly given the lack of a specific definition of “public interest.” Instead, the bill puts forward a non-exhaustive list of areas that fall under the “public interest”, including administrative errors, fraud, public health, public safety or national security. Even if we were to believe that the government would limit itself to acting in these areas, they are so broad as to be able to capture nearly any situation. “Public Safety” and “National Security” alone can, and have been, used by governments to excuse policies that target populations from specific countries, or of specific cultural or ethnic background, or that espouse particular political or religious beliefs.
Being able to mass cancel the documents of individuals already in the country raises horrendous possibilities of mass deportations based on tenuous allegations of “public safety,” all under the guise of protecting the “public interest.”
We may be told that the current government would not use these powers in this manner; that may well be true. But this cannot be guaranteed for future governments.
It is difficult to see how such powers can be saved through amendments. We would recommend that Part 7 be struck from Bill C-12.
Second, we are also critical of provisions in Part 5 that would expand the ability of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada to share private information across federal, provincial and territorial governments, as well as with foreign entities. These changes would have a significant impact on the privacy of all people in Canada, regardless of status. For migrants and refugees, the powers could inhibit their ability to access critical services without fear or harm, as well as pose serious risks for those fleeing persecution by foreign states. Permanent residents and Canadian citizens could also see their privacy impacted, including the sharing of personal details collected in residency or passport applications.
While the categories of what information can be shared may appear narrow, it could in fact be quite revealing, and could also be used in ways that would significantly impact an individual’s well-being and security far beyond the immigration and refugee system. This becomes especially true if information about changes to status, identity, or the refusal, termination or revocation of documents are shared with law enforcement or other provincial or municipal authorities, or foreign entities.
Moreover, once information is shared widely, it becomes nearly impossible to control its flow.
While Canadian laws may impose restrictions domestically, this is not the case once information is shared internationally. While officials have claimed C-12 will not permit foreign information sharing, we disagree, and I would be happy to share further details during the question and answer session.
Given all of this, and the fact that information disclosure powers already exist at the federal level, we would also argue that Part 5 should simply be removed.
Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.
Since you’re here…
… we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!
On February 2nd, 2026, the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group sent the following comments to the federal government in the context of their 30-day consultation on their proposed Regulations for the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (which was part of Bill C-70, the Combatting Foreign Interference Act, which was rushed through Parliament in May and June 2024):
Concerns
The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Regulations as currently drafted fail to clarify some key aspects of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry that were raised during the legislative process and that are necessary for ensuring clarity and specificity regarding the conditions under which individuals and organizations must register.
In particular, there is concern regarding the term “foreign principal” and what constitutes an “arrangement,” as well as the lack of inclusion of any clear exceptions to the requirement to register beyond those in the Act, which are currently insufficient.
These concerns are acknowledged in the “Consultation” subsection under “Regulatory Development”, where it states that “Lastly, civil society organizations and diaspora groups had questions about registration requirements for individuals linked to foreign-funded institutions or media outlets. Clarification on this issue will be shared through future outreach materials.”
However, future “outreach” will not adequately serve the purpose of providing the certainty necessary for individuals and organizations around whether their activities require registration with the foreign influence transparency registry that can only be achieved in either regulations or in the law. Moreover, during consultation sessions and engagement around the Combatting Foreign Interference Act, there were assurances given that certain areas would be further defined under regulation, including what constitutes a foreign principal, further specifics around what constitutes an arrangement with foreign principals, and entities or kinds of arrangements that would be excluded from the need to register.
Without further clarifications or carve-outs, Canadian organizations that work in association with, for example, the United Nations, NATO, the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization, La Francophonie or any other host of organizations whose members are States may face a requirement to register their activities with the foreign influence transparency registry. Canadian individuals and organizations who work in association with State controlled/funded academic institutions or media could also be required to register their activities. For example, countries, including France, Germany, Mexico, Australia, have extensive and robust publicly funded university systems. Others, like the UK, France and Australia, also feature publicly funded media.
Because of the lack of clear definition of what constitutes “working in association with” under the definition of an “arrangement” in the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, there is no clarity around what consists of an “association.” As the Canadian Civil Liberties Association pointed out in their brief on Bill C-70, there is no requirement for an association to consist of a subordinate relationship between the Canadian and foreign entity, where the foreign entity exerted a degree of control over the Canadian entity. Would, therefore, simply being in contact with a multilateral organization, an academic at a foreign university or with a journalist at a publicly funded broadcaster about an issue that raises public policy concerns, require registration? The lack of clarity in both the law, and in regulation, leaves this open to misinterpretation and a quashing of Canadian civil society engagement in multi-lateral platforms and discussions.
Given the significance of the administrative monetary penalties proposed in the regulations, this could result in a high degree of over-compliance and will also require the expenditure of valuable time and limited resources and capacity. It would also result in a large number of international cooperation activities that are in no way under “foreign influence” being labeled as such, and therefore stigmatizing work that is otherwise to be encouraged and supported.
This would also have an impact on freedom of expression, given that organizations that work with international partners who fall under the definition in the Act may refrain from speaking out on issues that they would normally engage on, because of the concern that they would now need to register.
Finally, the ICLMG remains concerned that the registry could be used to surveil international engagement instead of fulfilling its declared purpose. The information organizations will be required to submit would be a trove of data that government agencies would never otherwise be privy to. While on its own innocuous, it could be used to map legitimate activities for other national security or foreign affairs purposes that are at best case unrelated, but could also be either detrimental, harmful or at odds with the work being carried out. For example, information regarding international human rights work could reveal to government officials partnerships that would otherwise remain confidential to protect identities. While this may not be publicly listed in the registry, it could be accessed by national security agencies under other legislation. This information could be This information could be abused for political reasons, or used in ways that place the work or people’s lives in jeopardy.
Recommendations
It is imperative that regulations address these concerns before any future registry is established. We would encourage the government to re-open consultations with civil society stakeholders in advance of adopting these regulations. We would also recommend that the government look to other countries to examine what kind of carve outs and exceptions currently exist that could be integrated into this regime. This includes, for examples, carve outs for humanitarian aid and charities, for scientific, academic and religious pursuits, for news media, among others, in US, Australian and UK regimes.
Since you’re here…
… we have a small favour to ask. Here at ICLMG, we are working very hard to protect and promote human rights and civil liberties in the context of the so-called “war on terror” in Canada. We do not receive any financial support from any federal, provincial or municipal governments or political parties. You can become our patron on Patreon and get rewards in exchange for your support. You can give as little as $1/month (that’s only $12/year!) and you can unsubscribe at any time. Any donations will go a long way to support our work.You can also make a one-time donation or donate monthly via Paypal by clicking on the button below. On the fence about giving? Check out our Achievements and Gains since we were created in 2002. Thank you for your generosity!
The serious flaws and violations of the law uncovered in the first ever rigorous and independent review of Canada’s secretive No Fly List regime require an immediate response and urgent action on the part of the Canadian government.
